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Abstract: 
Social workers in mental health face a complex climate where they encounter value-laden 
intervention choices daily. Examples of these choices may include deciding to initiate treatment 
in spite of a client's wishes to the contrary, making a decision to break confidentiality, feeling 
pressured to diagnose a client with a reimbursable condition despite a treatment philosophy that 
may be to the contrary, or feeling the need to “pick and choose” therapy topics in light of severe 
shortages in benefit coverage. These and other scenarios put social work clinicians at risk for 
professional dissonance or what has been called a feeling of discomfort arising from the conflict 
between professional values and expected or required job tasks. The current article explores 
professional dissonance as a pertinent concept for social work in general, and mental health 
social work in particular. The theory base of the concept is explored as well as its utility for 
understanding burn-out in a deeper way. 
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Article: 
PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE DEFINED 
Professional dissonance is a new concept introduced here and is defined as a feeling of 
discomfort arising from the conflict between professional values and job tasks. It has been 
developed through the application of cognitive dissonance theory and existential theory to the 
study of values and ethics and to the realities of practice climate in the mental health social work 
arena. In this article, the author seeks to outline the philosophical background of professional 
dissonance and its utility as a way of understanding the deeper dimensions of burn-out formental 
health clinicians (see Figure 1). 
In recent research findings (Taylor & Bentley, 2005), professional dissonance has been affirmed 
as something seasoned mental health clinicians struggle with; however, the purpose of this article 
is to explore the conceptual basis of professional dissonance. Accordingly, the research findings 
will not be discussed in detail. 
Social workers are regularly asked, and often required, to formulate practice decisions that both 
protect society and maximize the rights of the individual–perhaps an impossible task. When the 
two aims are incompatible, social workers find themselves in the position of making a practice 
decision that may be unwanted and/or directly opposed by the consumer. An example of such a 
decision would be requiring an actively psychotic but not currently dangerous consumer who is 
handing out leaflets in the park to be hospitalized against his/her will. The decision to hospitalize 
may conflict with the social worker’s value commitment to self-determination. In these and 
many other situations, social workers have to deal with layers upon layers of competing values 
(Loewenberg, Dolgoff, & Harrington, 2000). For example, they may have a personal  
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value about self-determination: “I believe in the importance of choice above all else”; a group 
value: “I belong to X organization that opposes involuntary treatment”; a societal value: “I want 
to feel safe when I take my kids to that park”; and a professional value: “Agency policy requires 
me to intervene since I’m the case manager.” These value issues are further complicated by the 
fact that the worker may encounter competing values on each one of the levels. For example, a 
social worker, referring back to her/his professional values as exemplified in the NASW Code of 
Ethics, encounters mixed direction: “I can intervene based on the NASW Code of Ethics, but the 
Code also says I can restrict self-determination when it’s an imminent risk.” This exposition of 
levels of values involved in daily social work decision making is but one example of the 
potential complexity in intervention that faces mental health practitioners. 
PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE 
The core ideas of existential theory have influenced psychology, literature, and sociology as well 
as social work, and provide an important philosophical background in the conceptualization of 
professional dissonance. Existential theory is important to professional dissonance because the 
key existential issues of “authenticity” versus “bad faith,” and “ontological guilt” versus 
“ontological anxiety,” speak to the current struggle in mental health practice to negotiate a social 
work position that simultaneously protects a consumer’s rights (even to fail) and ensures the 
practitioners’ ability to make professional, caring, and sometimes unpopular decisions about how 
to intervene. Exploring the themes of existential philosophy also illuminates some reasons why 
the perennial struggle inmental health, around what is right and what is wrong to do when 
intervening in consumer’s lives, is so important. An existential philosophical background 
additionally suggests why social workers need to feel good about the decisions they make and 
what can happen when they do not.  
Professional dissonance can accurately be classified as an existential problem in that it relates to 
feelings which directly impact on our perception of ourselves as people, our feelings about the 
kind of people and professionals we are, and our feelings about how we should live our lives and 
fulfill our jobs. As Maddi (1996) points out, existential psychology, for all its diversity of 
thought, emphasizes above all else the central tenets of being genuine, honest, and true, and of 
“making decisions and shouldering responsibility for them” (p. 155). It is interesting to note that 
these themes are the opposite characteristics of a state of depersonalization, a dimension of 
unresolved burn-out (Pines & Maslach, 1978). 
The dissonance and dissonance resolution processes are ones filled with confusion, angst and, 
hopefully in the end, professional and personal growth. Pointing to a similar process, existential 
philosophy affirms the opportunity for and necessity to form meaning out of suffering (Krill, 
1996). Social work practice is filled with examples of consumers and families coming through 
crises and illnesses with greater life understanding. Author and mental health consumer, Lori 
Schiller (Schiller & Bennett, 1994) ends her biography as follows: 
Looking over my life, I know now that I don’t want to go back. I want to go ahead . . . If 
my life and my experiences can help other people find their ways out of darkness, I will 
know that I have not wasted the great gift I have been given: the chance to begin life 
again. (p. 270) 
Similarly, when mental health practitioners confront feelings of angst, conflict, and frustration 
before coming to the best practice decision they can, they are attempting to protect excellence in 
practice. 
While many aspects of existential theory have been helpful in developing the concept of 
professional dissonance, the existential concepts of ontological guilt and ontological anxiety 
have most influenced the conceptualization. In order to understand these ideas, the existential 
concepts of being and being-in-the-world, authenticity, and bad faith are first presented and 
briefly defined. An exposition of ontological guilt and ontological anxiety follows. 
Being and Being-in-the-World. Existential philosophers place a great deal of emphasis on being. 
Maddi (1996) points out that the German word for being (“daesin”) does not carry the static 
connotation that “being” has in the English language. Instead, the word is more active and 
actually means, “becoming.” In this way, the existential focus is on human potentiality. In order 
to always be “becoming” and not have stagnated, the person must continue to act authentically 
and avoid bad faith actions that delude and detract from the metamorphic process of becoming. 
As it applies to mental health practitioners, the concept of being would, among other things, 
connote continuing to develop as an excellent practitioner, working hard to lend individuality to 
every practice situation, and having a dynamic, present orientation. 
Authenticity versus Bad Faith Actions. Authenticity is often used as a synonym for genuineness. 
Hepworth, Rooney, and Larsen (1997), in their widely used direct practice social work textbook, 
define authenticity as “the sharing of self by relating in a natural, sincere, spontaneous, open and 
genuine manner” (p. 120). They further describe the authentic social worker’s verbalizations as 
congruent with their thoughts and feelings. In this way, they relate to consumers as real people, 
expressing and taking responsibility for their feelings instead of denying them or blaming the 
client for them. This focus on congruency between thoughts and feelings, and on assuming 
responsibility for them whether or not they fit in with societal ideas of what is normal or good, is 
closely related to the existential focus on authenticity. The existential hero, exemplified in texts 
such as Camus’ (1946) The Stranger and Sartre’s (1947) The Age of Reason, embodies the ideal 
of “authenticity” and is therefore often seen as abnormal or strange as s/he strives to realize 
“being.” By acting in accordance with internal guidance, the existential hero avoids being 
deluded by the trappings of normality and the conformity of society. In this way, bad faith 
actions are guarded against and the individual continues her/his process of “becoming.” 
Bad faith actions are the antithesis of authenticity. When an individual acts in a “bad faith” way, 
s/he is acting against what his or her inner voice is directing. For example, a social worker who 
internally supports an individual consumer’s stance not to take medication because the worker 
believes that for this consumer the disadvantages outweigh the advantages, commits a bad faith 
action when s/he pursues an inpatient commitment due to pressure from a supervisor or from the 
consumer’s family. Similarly, a practitioner who upholds self-determination simply because s/he 
doesn’t want to have to struggle with the paperwork involved in a commitment procedure, even 
though the consumer needs to be hospitalized, commits a bad faith action as well. Individuals 
who continually choose bad faith actions over authentic responses stop progressing as 
“becoming” human beings. They may also stop taking responsibility (another key existential 
concept) for their choices. In the examples above, the social workers may blame their choices on 
society, on a difficult family, or even on the consumers themselves. But when the becoming 
process halts, individuals become aware of feeling bad or being in psychological pain. According 
to existential psychology, the individual feels bad due to the cumulative weight of ontological 
guilt accumulated through repeated bad faith actions. Maddi (1996) suggests this is what Soren 
Kierkegaard, one of the first existential philosophers, meant by the phrase “sickness unto death” 
(p. 162), and what Thoreau was getting at when he said most people “lead lives of quiet 
desperation” (p. 162).  
Ontological Anxiety versus Ontological Guilt. In current research, dissonance is related to the 
concept of anxiety, one that existential writers have long argued is misunderstood. Rollo May 
(1983), a prominent existential author, wrote that the German word Freud and Kierkegaard, 
among others, use for anxiety is “angst.” While it has no exact English equivalent, angst has 
been translated as “dread” as well as “anxiety,” and captures the experience of being “torn,” or in 
a dilemma. Accordingly, May points out that anxiety “always involves inner conflict” (p. 111). 
Anxiety has a “becoming” quality in that it can lead to growth (Maddi, 1996). One has daily 
choices either to continue becoming and face the resulting ontological anxiety, or to simply 
choose comfort and stasis and therefore stagnate. Maddi describes ontological anxiety, or the 
anxiety of becoming, quite eloquently: 
Only when you have clearly seen the abyss and jumped into it with no assurance of 
survival can you call yourself a human being. Then, if you survive, you shall be called a 
hero, for you will have created your own life. (p. 162) 
Quite simply, ontological anxiety is the price of living authentically. By contrast, choosing the 
more comfortable, non-anxiety-provoking course of action will, in the short term, result in 
feeling safer but in the long term lead to the more malignant state of “ontological guilt.” 
Ontological anxiety, while uncomfortable, is more a pain of risk or a growing pain, while 
ontological guilt is the pain of not accessing one’s potential, accompanied by the ache of regret 
about “whatmight have been.” Series of bad faith actions result in heavy ontological guilt which 
envelopes the individual in shame and regret, paralyzing their process of becoming. 
One may well ask what all this abyss jumping has to do with intervention in mental health. But 
existential psychology, with its focus on authenticity and responsibility, speaks directly to the 
cost of bad faith actions (choosing not to jump). In this way, it answers the question of what 
happens to social workers who consistently act in ways that conflict with their ideas about what 
they should be doing, or as Margolin (1997) says, “who live in contradiction.” It also changes the 
negative cast usually given to anxiety, and encompasses anxiety as a potential growing 
experience. In this way, existential psychology balances the prevailing view of anxiety as burn-
out or pathological by casting it as a growing pain. The recasting is compatible with the concept 
of professional dissonance, which combines the view of anxiety as problematic (as seen in 
cognitive psychology and ego psychology) with the idea of anxiety as a possible vehicle toward 
practice excellence. 
PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE AND BURN-OUT 
Burn-Out, the “syndrome of physical and emotional exhaustion, involving the development of 
negative self-concept, negative job attitudes, and a loss of concern and feeling for clients” (Pines 
& Maslach, 1978, p. 224), has been called an occupational hazard for human service providers 
(Gomez &Michaelis, 1995). Additionally, social workers in mental health are more likely to 
experience burn-out and have decreased job satisfaction as comparedwith social workers in other 
areas (Acker,1999). The three-dimensional construct of burn-out includes emotional exhaustion, 
depersonalization, and feelings of reduced personal accomplishment (Enzmann, Schaufeli, 
Janssen, & Roseman, 1998). As a concept, professional dissonance seeks to add a new element 
to the discussion around burn-out and job satisfaction by exploring the ways social workers feel 
torn or ambivalent about the ways their values and work interventions coexist. For example, a 
practitioner may have worked tirelessly to help a consumer attain disability benefits that the 
practitioner feels are desperately needed. The consumer, upon getting the hard-won benefits, 
may decide that s/he really should work, despite not having been able to keep a job for more than 
a few weeks in the past. In this example, the client’s wishes and right to self-determine must be 
weighed against the practitioner’s view of the situation in making a decision about how to 
intervene. In short, professional dissonance relates to the burn-out literature in that it attempts to 
understand the inner lives of social workers and how their inner thoughts and outer actions may 
contribute to burn-out. 
PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE THEORY 
The theory of professional dissonance was conceptualized by Leon Festinger and other cognitive 
theorists. Festinger (1962) developed cognitive dissonance theory in the 1960s as a “consistency 
theory,” so designated because it emphasizes the premise that humans desire congruence in their 
thinking and will act to reduce inconsistency among thoughts, and between thoughts and 
behaviors. He defines cognitive dissonance as “the existence of nonfitting relations among 
cognitions” (p. 3). In other words, a person who has two cognitions that are inconsistent, 
experiences dissonance–a negative drive state similar to hunger or thirst (Aronson, 1997). 
Festinger goes on to describe the reduction of dissonance as a basic process among humans. 
More recently, Aronson (1997) expanded Festinger’s more “cerebral” brand of cognitive 
dissonance by emphasizing the role behavior plays in causing dissonance. Aronson 
conceptualizes dissonance as strongest when a cognition related to self-concept conflicts with a 
cognition about behavior. In other words, dissonance is strong when an action contradicts a 
belief about the self. This type of cognitive dissonance–the conflict between behavior and self-
concept–is seen as giving rise to professional dissonance. As it applies to social workers, 
professional dissonance can occur when an individual’s identification with her/his professional 
values conflicts with certain expected or required job tasks. 
The issue of insight or perception in the conceptualization of professional dissonance is very 
important. A social worker who has experienced and successfully resolved her/his dissonance, 
whether positively or negatively, may not be aware of the process s/he went through to come 
through the dissonant situation. On the other hand, another social worker may be very aware of 
the parts of her/his job situation that create discomfort by placing her/him in a value-dissonant 
position. For this reason, the dimension of felt value/job conflict is important in understanding 
professional dissonance. It joins the other dimensions, unconscious dissonance and felt anxiety, 
in framing the experience of professional dissonance (see Figure 1). It is simply defined as the 
actual, felt, or reported discrepancy between a job intervention, such as placing a consumer in the 
hospital against her/his wishes, and a professional value such as self-determination. 
Festinger (1962) outlines three types of relationships among cognitions: irrelevance, consonance, 
and dissonance. In an irrelevant relationship, the two cognitions have no relationship (“That 
consumer is creative and energetic,” “I’m out of Post-It notes”). When cognitions are consonant, 
the cognitions are consistent and complement one another (“That consumer is creative and 
energetic,” “I really like that consumer”). In the final relationship, the two cognitions conflict 
with one another (“That consumer is creative and energetic,” “The consumer is becoming manic 
and needs to be hospitalized”). Dissonant cognitions result in discomfort accompanied by a 
desire to make the cognitions more consonant, and thereby alleviate the discomfort (“It’s ok to 
be high energy but she’s going too far,” “If I don’t act now she may get worse”). 
In understanding the way professional dissonance applies to clinical practice, it is important to 
explore how clinicians employ dissonance resolution strategies in attempting to alleviate their 
discomfort (“I’m acting in her best interests, that’s my job,” “She’s been hospitalized a lot, one 
more time is not going to make that much of an impact”). In this example, the social worker who 
feels dissonant about having to hospitalize her/his “favorite” consumer, first attempts to 
rationalize the intervention and then minimizes the impact of the intervention on the consumer. 
The goal is to alleviate the social worker’s dissonance. In summarizing cognitive dissonance as a 
theory, Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) cite four ways in which dissonance can be reduced: (1) 
by removing the dissonant cognition: “I had no choice”; (2) by adding new consonant cognitions: 
“I’m helping her”; (3) by reducing the importance of dissonant cognitions: “She really doesn’t 
mind being in the hospital”; and, (4) by increasing the importance of consonant cognitions: “Her 
safety is the most important thing.” This last strategy mirrors the process of ranking values by 
importance in individual situations that Loewenberg, Dolgoff, and Harrington (2000) have 
described. 
An individual clinician’s insight into his or her own dissonance reduction processes may wax 
and wane, in much the way a person may unconsciously use a defense to manage anxiety without 
being aware of what s/he is doing. Even if the person is aware, once experienced dissonance has 
been reduced or resolved, s/he is comfortable again and has a stake in remaining comfortable 
instead of rehashing the reasons for the initial dissonance. This is important in understanding 
professional dissonance as a supervisory issue, because the clinical supervisor’s role may be to 
stimulate dissonant discussions that raise anxiety in an effort to illuminate constructive 
dissonance reduction. This again underlines existential theory’s emphasis on anxiety as growing 
pains, versus society’s current stance that anxiety is pathological. 
PROFESSIONAL DISSONANCE’S IMPORTANCE TO SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 
The concept of professional dissonance is significant to clinical social work practice for several 
reasons. First, it draws attention to the phenomena as it affects clinical social work theory and 
practice, and underlines the need for future inquiry into practice-based issues in mental health. 
Second, it illuminates the complexities and ramifications of social work practice decision making 
in cases that present value collisions (Frankl, 1988). In this way, it makes social work values, 
particularly the value of self-determination, an area of future inquiry, and an essential topic for 
practice-based research. Finally, the study of professional dissonance has implications for 
practitioners’ relationships with consumers in mental health practice, and for the makers of 
mental health policy. 
Conceptualizing professional dissonance adds another dimension to research about burn-out and 
the protection of job satisfaction. The ways in which social workers operationalize social work 
values and use them to guide their practice needs to be studied further (Rothman, Smith, 
Nakashima, Paterson, &Mustin, 1996) as does the way practitioners rank order values by 
importance, depending on practice situations (Loewenberg, Dolgoff, & Harrington, 2000). 
Creative, effective strategies for supporting practitioners in negotiating difficult practice 
decisions need to be prioritized in order to insure longevity, despite contradictions in mission and 
values and actual practice life (Margolin, 1997). Professional dissonance emphasizes the 
imperative nature of research that aims to support practitioners in the decisions they make around 
practice interventions with mental health consumers. 
Social work in today’s practice environments is complex. Accordingly, it is essential that the 
profession support an ongoing dialog and facilitate an engaging climate in which 
multidimensional issues that lend clarity to value dilemmas in practice can be explored. Social 
work values need to be concretized for daily practice, so they take on real-life meaning and 
benefit both consumers and social workers. Focusing attention on values and value conflicts 
protects the mission of social work and vitalizes the Code of Ethics with living examples of its 
value and domain in daily clinical practice. Consistent support and protection of career 
satisfaction ensures individual social worker’s longevity in the profession, improves consumers’ 
quality of life, and facilitates excellence in the profession’s continued partnership with persons 
who have mental illness. 
Social workers need to feel safe in their organizations if they are to continually analyze ongoing 
practice decisions. Professional dissonance need not have negative effects if room is made in 
professional organizations and in agencies for ongoing dialogue and value clarification. In this 
way, the existential focus on anxiety as a possible vehicle for growth is applied to experiences of 
professional dissonance in day-to-day practice. By supporting social workers in deliberating 
about practice issues, we foster a healthy tension that may well lead to more innovative practice 
and policy interventions. 
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